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ABSTRACT
Since its enactment in 1996, § 230 of the Communications
Decency Act has shielded Web site operators from liability arising
out of third-party content. The statute preempts any claim that would
treat the defendant as a “publisher” or “speaker” of that content, but
recent cases suggest that a defendant’s own statements may
constitute an independent source of liability beyond the scope of
§ 230. In Mazur v. eBay, a federal district court held that § 230 does
not bar claims of fraudulent misrepresentation when a defendant has
described a third party’s auctioning procedures as “safe.” More
recently, the Ninth Circuit in Barnes v. Yahoo! allowed a promissory
estoppel claim to proceed against a defendant that failed to remove
defamatory material from its Web site after assuring the plaintiff it
would do so. A third case, Goddard v. Google, suggests that the
Barnes decision could support claims by third-party beneficiaries as
well. This Article analyzes these recent developments, discusses their
potential impact on representations in marketing and terms of use,
and assesses the willingness of courts to consider more expansive
fraud- and contract-based limitations on § 230 immunity.
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INTRODUCTION
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (CDA)1 shields
Web site operators from liability by barring causes of action that
would treat them as the “publisher” or “speaker” of third-party
content. 2 Courts have been willing to apply its provisions to virtually
any kind of dispute involving third-party content.
However, a recent line of cases suggests that a Web site
operator’s affirmative representations regarding its third-party content
could create an alternative basis for liability to which § 230 does not
apply. In Mazur v. eBay, 3 a federal district court held that § 230 did
not bar a claim of fraudulent misrepresentation, and in Barnes v.
Yahoo!, 4 the Ninth Circuit allowed a promissory estoppel claim to
proceed on the grounds that it did not treat the defendant as a
“publisher.” A more recent case, Goddard v. Google, 5 suggests that
the Barnes holding could support claims by third-party beneficiaries
as well. These cases reveal that affirmative representations can give
1

47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006).
See generally 4 RAYMOND T. NIMMER, THE LAW OF COMPUTER
TECHNOLOGY § 14:11 (4th ed. 2010).
3
Mazur v. eBay Inc., No. 07-03967, 2008 WL 618988 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 4,
2008).
4
Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2009).
5
Goddard v. Google, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 2d 1193 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
2
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rise to liability if they amount to fraudulent misrepresentation or
constitute an enforceable promise, creating potential pitfalls for
online businesses with respect to marketing, customer service, and
even user agreements.
This Article first provides an overview of § 230 and the early
attempts by plaintiffs to establish liability without treating the
defendant as a publisher. Next, the Article analyzes the recent cases
that have begun to recognize a limit on § 230 immunity based on a
defendant’s own representations. The Article concludes by discussing
how these decisions are shaping CDA jurisprudence and the
implications for Web site operators.
I. A THREE-PART TEST FOR IMMUNITY
Section 230 was designed, in part, to allow Web site operators to
voluntarily monitor their sites for offensive or obscene material
without exposing themselves to liability for third-party content. 6 The
statute declares that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer
service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information
provided by another information content provider.” 7
To determine whether a defendant is entitled to immunity, courts
engage in a three-part analysis. 8 First, the defendant must be a
“provider or user of an interactive computer service.” 9 This
effectively encompasses all Web sites. 10 Next, because the scope of
§ 230 extends only to third-party content, the defendant will not
receive immunity if it is “responsible … for the creation or
development” 11 of the offending content. Finally, the cause of action
must treat the defendant as the “publisher” or “speaker” of the
6

Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997).
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2006).
8
See, e.g., Universal Commc’n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 418–
22 (1st Cir. 2007).
9
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2006).
10
The Internet itself qualifies as an “interactive computer service,” and
therefore, a defendant need only be a “user” of the Internet to satisfy the first prong
of the test. Because every Web site operator is necessarily an Internet user, this
requirement is rarely the subject of litigation. See Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018,
1030–31 (9th Cir. 2003).
11
See 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3) (defining “information content provider”).
7
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content. 12 Claims that would hold the defendant liable in some other
capacity are unaffected by § 230. 13 It is this distinction that makes
affirmative representations potentially problematic.
II. EARLY ATTEMPTS AT ESTABLISHING AN ALTERNATIVE BASIS FOR
LIABILITY
To avoid treating the defendant as a publisher, plaintiffs have
long sought to base their claims on actions by the defendant that go
beyond a publisher’s “traditional editorial functions,” 14 thereby
providing an independent basis for liability. For instance, in
Blumenthal v. Drudge 15 the plaintiff argued that AOL could be held
liable for the defamatory material of co-defendant Matt Drudge
because AOL had “affirmatively promoted Drudge as a new source of
unverified instant gossip.” 16 The court nevertheless concluded that
the language of § 230 clearly protected the decision to advertise thirdparty content. 17 In Schneider v. Amazon.com, Inc., 18 a defendant had
promised to remove certain offensive postings within two business
days but failed to do so.19 Although the plaintiff argued that this
promise constituted an independently enforceable obligation, the
court determined that it fell within the scope of § 230 because the
“purported breach—failure to remove the posting—[was] an exercise
of editorial discretion.” 20 Courts have also rejected arguments based
on a defendant’s failure to enforce standards of conduct set out in its
membership agreement. 21 As these early cases illustrate, plaintiffs
12

47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2006).
See, e.g., Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1107 (9th Cir. 2009)
(denying immunity where defendant breached an independent contractual duty).
14
“Traditional editorial functions” include “deciding whether to publish,
withdraw, postpone or alter content.” See Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327,
330 (4th Cir. 1997).
15
Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp 44 (D.D.C. 1998).
16
Id. at 51.
17
Id. at 52–53.
18
Schneider v. Amazon.com, Inc., 31 P.3d 37 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001).
19
Id. at 38–39.
20
Id. at 42.
21
See, e.g., Green v. Am. Online, Inc., 318 F.3d 465 (3rd Cir. 2003);
Morrison v. Am. Online, Inc., 153 F. Supp. 2d 930 (N.D. Ind. 2001).
13
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have historically been unsuccessful at suing defendants for third-party
material without also treating them as publishers.
III. FRAUDULENT MISREPRESENTATION IN MAZUR V. EBAY
The ruling in Mazur v. eBay, however, put Web site operators on
notice that their own statements regarding third-party content could
carry significant consequences. In Mazur, the defendant offered a
service called Live Auctions, which allowed users to participate in
formal auctions via the Internet as if they were physically there. 22
Third-party auction houses conducted the auctions; eBay merely
provided the service that allowed people to place bids at these
auctions over the Internet.23 On its Web site, eBay claimed that this
service was “very safe,” that the live auctions involved “floor
bidders,” and that the auctions were conducted by “reputable
international auction houses” that were “carefully screened.” 24
Nevertheless, the plaintiff alleged that shill bidders 25 at the auction
house caused her to overpay. She sued eBay, claiming that its
statements regarding the live auctions amounted to fraudulent
misrepresentation.
The court analyzed each of eBay’s assertions independently. It
determined that eBay was entitled to immunity for its representation
that the auction houses were “reputable” and “carefully screened.” 26
The court explained that “screening” auction houses is analogous to
deciding what to publish, and is therefore a traditional editorial
function shielded by § 230. 27 Furthermore, the words “carefully” and
“reputable” indicate opinions, which are not actionable. 28
However, eBay's assertions that the live auctions were “safe” and
22

Mazur v. eBay Inc., No. 07-03967, 2008 WL 618988, at *1 (N.D. Cal.
Mar. 4, 2008).
23
On April 15, 2008, eBay announced that it would discontinue its Live
Auctions service. General Announcements, EBAY.COM, (April 15, 2008),
http://www2.ebay.com/aw/core/200804151300402.html.
24
Mazur, 2008 WL 618988, at *8.
25
“Shill bidding” is the practice of entering fake bids in order to drive up the
price of an auction item.
26
Mazur, 2008 WL 618988, at *9.
27
Id.
28
Id.
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involved “floor bidders” at “international” auction houses were held
to be actionable as affirmative representations. 29 According to the
opinion, these statements went beyond traditional editorial discretion
because they created “an expectation regarding the procedures and
manner in which the auction is conducted.” 30 The court indicated that
if eBay had made assurances of accuracy, it would have received
immunity, as verifying accuracy constitutes a traditional editorial
function. 31 Assurances of safety, however, would fall outside the
scope of § 230. 32
The court also determined that eBay’s disclaimers were
ineffective for two reasons. First, they failed to negate either the
assurance of safety or the implicit suggestion that eBay had
investigated the auction houses. 33 Although eBay stated in its User
Agreement that it had no control over the safety of the auctions and
could not guarantee that the auction houses complied with applicable
laws, “nothing [in the User Agreement] specifically state[d] that eBay
[did] not guarantee that bidding in Live Auctions [was] safe.” 34
Second, eBay failed to demonstrate that the initial safety assurances
were attributable to another source, such as user feedback. 35 As a
result, users could not independently assess the veracity of the claim
and were left to depend on eBay’s representations. Having made the
statements on its own behalf, eBay could no longer rely on general
disclaimers applicable to third-party conduct.
IV. CONTRACTUAL LIABILITY IN BARNES V. YAHOO! AND
GODDARD V. GOOGLE
A defendant’s liability is not limited to fraud, however. A recent
Ninth Circuit case demonstrates that affirmative representations can
furnish the basis for liability under contract principles as well.
29

Id. at *10.
Id. at *12.
31
See id. See also Milo v. Martin, 311 S.W.3d 210 (Tex. App. 2010) (finding
defendant not liable for the defamatory posts of users, despite assurances of
accuracy found elsewhere on its Web site).
32
See Mazur, 2008 WL 618988, at *12.
33
Id. at *10.
34
Id. at *11.
35
Id. at *10.
30
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In Barnes v. Yahoo!, 36 the plaintiff discovered that her exboyfriend had created fake profiles under her name on a Yahoo! Web
site. 37 Over the next two months, Barnes made four requests to have
the profiles taken down, but Yahoo! never responded to any of
them. 38 Finally, as local news prepared to broadcast a report on the
incident, a representative from Yahoo! contacted Barnes and told her
that she would “personally walk the statements over to the division
responsible for stopping unauthorized profiles and they would take
care of it.” 39 Despite this assurance however, the profiles remained on
the Web site until Barnes filed suit two months later, alleging
promissory estoppel and negligent undertaking. 40
The court held that § 230 did not preempt a promissory estoppel
claim arising out of the defendant’s promise to remove third-party
content from its Web site. 41 According to the opinion, such a claim
would not seek to treat the defendant as a “publisher.” 42 Instead, it
was the defendant’s promise, and not its status as a publisher, that
gave rise to liability. 43 The court did, however, hold that § 230 barred
the plaintiff’s negligent undertaking claim, explaining that if the
action the defendant undertook to do was “something [that]
publishers do,” then the cause of action would seek to hold the
defendant liable as a publisher. 44 In this case, the “duty” allegedly
violated stemmed from Yahoo!'s conduct as a publisher—“the steps it
allegedly took, but later supposedly abandoned, to de-publish the
offensive profiles.” 45
The two claims differed in one important respect. “Undertake” is
synonymous with the performance of the action; “[t]o undertake a
thing ... is to do it.”46 In contrast, one can promise to do something
without actually doing it. Consequently, a defendant cannot be held
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46

Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2009).
Id. at 1098.
Id.
Id. at 1098–99.
Id. at 1099.
Id. at 1109.
Id. at 1107.
Id.
Id. at 1103.
Id.
Id. at 1107.
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liable for undertaking an editorial action, but it can be liable for
breaking a promise, even if that promise was to undertake an editorial
action. 47 The promise itself gives rise to a duty that is distinct from
the conduct at hand.
A federal district court in Goddard v. Google 48 has since
concluded that the rule in Barnes would also permit claims by thirdparty beneficiaries. 49 “Theoretically, intended third-party
beneficiaries—whose rights under a contract are different from those
of the contracting parties but still are legally cognizable—could
invoke the distinction drawn in Barnes between liability for acts that
are coextensive with publishing or speaking and liability for breach of
an independent contractual duty.” 50 The plaintiff in Goddard was an
Internet user who incurred fees after downloading purportedly “free”
ringtones from a Web site that appeared as a “sponsored result” on
the defendant’s search engine. 51 The terms of Google’s advertising
contracts required advertisers to disclose information about any fees
they might charge. 52 Because the advertisement that appeared on
Google’s Web site lacked such information, the complaint alleged
that Google had breached the terms of its advertising contracts.53 The
plaintiff claimed to be a third-party beneficiary of those contracts.54
Though the court acknowledged the possibility of suits by thirdparty beneficiaries, it nonetheless dismissed the plaintiff’s claim,
citing two flaws. 55 First, it was the advertisers, not Google, who
promised to disclose information about fees and who subsequently
broke that promise. 56 The contracts did not contain any promise by
Google to enforce their terms or to remove noncompliant

47

See id. (“Contract liability here would come not from Yahoo’s publishing
conduct, but from Yahoo’s manifest intention to be legally obligated to do
something, which happens to be removal of material from publication.”)
48
Goddard v. Google, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 2d 1193 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
49
Id. at 1200.
50
Id.
51
Id. at 1194, 1197.
52
Id. at 1199.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
Id. at 1200–01.
56
Id. at 1201.
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advertisements. 57 Second, even if Google had promised to police its
Web site for noncompliant advertisements, there was no indication
that the promisees (the advertising companies) had intended for the
plaintiff to benefit from such a promise. 58 The plaintiff therefore did
not qualify as a third-party beneficiary. 59
The contractual theory of liability that emerges from Barnes and
Goddard is subject to two important limitations that distinguish it
from the approach seen in Mazur. The Barnes court stressed that a
promise must be clear and specific if it is to support a promissory
estoppel claim: “[A] court cannot simply infer a promise from an
attempt to de-publish of the sort that might support tort liability”
under a theory of promissory estoppel. 60 The Goddard court
explained that “general content policies” do not constitute a promise
by the Web site to take any specific action with regard to third-party
content.61 A general claim of safety, such as the one in Mazur, would
likely fail to meet this specificity requirement.
The other critical distinction between the two theories is that,
under Barnes, a potential defendant can avoid liability by simply
disclaiming any intent to be legally bound. 62 In contrast, the Mazur
opinion would seem to limit the availability of disclaimers to
situations where the Web site operator has either explicitly disavowed
its own statements or clearly indicated that those statements are
attributable to a source other than itself.

57

Id. (“Neither agreement contains any promise by Google to enforce its
terms of use or otherwise to remove noncompliant advertisements.”)
58
Id. The court stated that Goddard might well be able to sue the advertisers
for breaching their promise to abide by the Advertising Terms if she could
demonstrate that Google had intended for her to be a beneficiary of that agreement.
59
Id.
60
Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1108 (9th Cir. 2009).
61
Goddard, 640 F. Supp. 2d at 1201. It should be noted that although the
Barnes court did not address whether the actual statement by the Yahoo
representative would suffice for purposes of promissory estoppel, the Goddard
opinion suggests that it would. “[T]he claim in Barnes … rested on a promise that
scarcely could have been clearer or more direct.” Id.
62
See Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1108.
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V. STRATEGIES FOR MAINTAINING IMMUNITY
As a result of these developments, Web site operators run the risk
of sacrificing § 230 immunity when they issue statements regarding
their third-party material. However, a Web site operator may be able
to minimize its exposure by taking certain measures.
When promoting a product or service, a Web site operator must
have a clear understanding of the message being conveyed. If an
affirmative representation tends to suggest that a particular harm will
not occur in connection with that product or service, the Web site
operator could be viewed as having voluntarily assumed
responsibility for its third-party content.63 Similarly, if a Web site
operator imposes restrictions in its user agreement on the type of
material that third parties can post, it might inadvertently assume a
duty to enforce those standards by blocking or removing offensive
material. Any statements to this effect should include language
alerting users to the possibility that nonconforming content may
appear on the site. 64
The form of the representation warrants particular attention.
Anything phrased as a promise or assurance has the potential to bind
the Web site operator, so companies should instruct their employees
to avoid making such statements to outside parties. Because
representations of fact are actionable, Web sites should consider
phrasing that would tend to indicate an opinion. Along the same lines,
it may be helpful to insert language into a representation that relates
back to an editorial function. The Mazur court indicated that a
plaintiff could not sue a Web site for commenting on its own
publishing activities, as doing so would treat the defendant as a
publisher. 65
To avoid falling victim to the contractual theories of liability
63

Eric Goldman, eBay Denied 230 Defense for Its Marketing
Representations--Mazur v. eBay, TECHNOLOGY & MARKETING LAW BLOG (Mar.
13, 2008), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2008/03/ebay_denied_230.htm.
64
For further suggestions on drafting user agreements, see Eric Goldman,
Lori Drew Conviction Reflections, Part 3 of 3: Lessons for Cyberlawyers Drafting
User Agreements, TECHNOLOGY & MARKETING LAW BLOG (Dec. 16, 2008),
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2008/12/lori_drew_convi_2.htm.
65
Mazur v. eBay Inc., No. 07-03967, 2008 WL 618988, at *9 (N.D. Cal.
Mar. 4, 2008).
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developed in the Barnes and Goddard cases, one should always
disclaim any intent to be legally bound. This is especially important
when the Web site is providing assistance or otherwise responding to
user requests. Furthermore, if the Web site is contracting with another
party, such as an advertiser, the contract should specify that no one
other than the contracting parties is intended to be a beneficiary of the
agreement.
As the Mazur case illustrates, however, Web site operators will
not always be able to protect themselves through the use of
disclaimers. The court made it clear that if it is to be effective at all, a
disclaimer must specifically negate the affirmative representation, 66
although given the court’s manifest hostility toward their use, 67 it is
doubtful that disclaimers would ever be effective under the Mazur
standard.
Whenever possible, a Web site will want to attribute a
representation to some source other than itself. For example, the
Mazur court indicated that eBay would have been entitled to
immunity had its assertion of safety been made on the basis of user
feedback, rather than its own independent assessment. 68 Web sites
can avoid responsibility by indicating that the representation
originated elsewhere. If, on the other hand, a particular statement
represents an assertion by the Web site itself, the threat of litigation
can be minimized by disclosing the basis for these assertions or the
criteria used to reach a particular conclusion. This allows users to
evaluate the claims for themselves.
VI. A NEW DIRECTION FOR CDA JURISPRUDENCE?
Given the highly fact-dependent nature of their holdings, it is
unlikely that these recent decisions will appreciably alter the balance
66

See id. at *10–11.
The court determined that eBay’s disclaimers were ineffective despite
language such as “We have no control over the quality, safety, or legality of the
items advertised” and “You will not hold eBay responsible for other users’ actions
or inactions, including things they post.” See id. at *10, n.9; *12. Citing the fact that
eBay “burie[d the] disclaimer in a User Agreement” and possessed “superior
bargaining power,” the court stated that it would deny eBay’s motion to dismiss if
the affirmative representation and the disclaimer were contradictory. Id. at *13.
68
Id. at *10.
67
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of power in § 230 disputes. However, while these cases—Mazur,
Barnes, and Goddard—represent developments at the margins, they
may nevertheless reflect a conscious effort by the judiciary to prevent
an already generous grant of immunity from expanding further. When
it came to their publishing activities, Web site operators once faced
virtually no threat of liability, but a more nuanced application of
§ 230 creates new avenues for plaintiffs to explore. The idea that
immunity can be lost by “affirmatively promoting” content,
ultimately rejected in Blumenthal, has gained traction in the wake of
Mazur. Whereas Schneider had extended immunity to contract claims
if the breach resulted from an exercise of editorial discretion, Barnes
now imposes liability under virtually identical facts. Even a contract
between a Web site and an advertiser may create enforceable rights in
other parties under the reasoning of Goddard. Plaintiffs are sure to
test the limits of these emerging theories in future cases.
CONCLUSION
Although § 230 of the CDA preempts any cause of action that
would treat the defendant as a “publisher” or “speaker” of third-party
content, recent cases demonstrate that suits premised on a Web site
operator’s own statements do not necessarily fall within this category.
As a result of Mazur v. eBay, Barnes v. Yahoo!, and Goddard v.
Google, affirmative representations regarding third-party content may
now serve as an independent source of liability if they amount to
fraudulent misrepresentation or constitute an enforceable promise.
These developments will affect how Web sites can market third-party
content, interact with users, and form agreements with other parties.
PRACTICE POINTERS


Although § 230 provides protection against liability arising out of
third-party content, Web site operators remain fully responsible for
the accuracy of their statements regarding that content.



Section 230 provides no defense to binding contracts created
under the theory of promissory estoppel, even when the statement
giving rise to the obligation revolves around third-party content.



Disclaimers may be sufficient to protect a Web site operator
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against promissory estoppel claims, but they are unlikely to protect
against claims of fraudulent misrepresentation.


Web site operators can reduce the threat of litigation by either
explaining the basis for their affirmative representations or
attributing them to another source.

